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The socioeconomic performance of today's workers depends not only on parental skills,
but also on the average skills of the ethnic group in the parent's generation (or ethnic capital).
This paper investigates the link between the ethnic externality and ethnic neighborhoods. The
evidence indicates that residential segregation and the external effect of ethnicity are linked,
partly because ethnic capital summarizes the socioeconomic background of the neighborhood
where the children were raised. Ethnicity has an external effect, even among persons whogrow
up in the same neighborhood, when children are exposed frequendy to persons who share the
same ethnic background.
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Ethnic neighborhoods have long been a dominant feature of Americancities(and of cities
in many other countries). In fact,segregation by race and ethnicity often defines theinvisible line
that creates a neighborhood. These neighborhoods insulate people of similar backgrounds, and
foster a set of cultural attitudes, social contacts, and economic opportunities that affect workers
throughout their lives.
In earlier work (Boxjas, 1992, 1994), I have argued that ethnicity has an external effecton
the human capital accumulation process.' Persons raised in advantageous ethnic environments
will be exposed to social and economic factors that increase their productivity, and the largeror
more frequent the amount of this exposure, the higher the resulting "quality" of the worker.
As with the models that dominate the new growth literature, sufficiently strong ethnic
externalities may delay the convergence of ethnic differentials indefinitely. My earlier empirical
work indicated that the earnings of children are affected strongly not only by parental earnings as
in the usual models of intergenerational income mobility, but also by the mean earnings of the
ethnic group in the parent's generation (which I called "ethnic capital"). As a result, the ethnic
spillover effect retards intergenerational improvement for relatively disadvantaged ethnic groups,
and slows down the deterioration of skills (i.e., the regression towards the mean)among the more
advantaged groups.
tTheimportance ofhuman capital externalitiesinintergenerational mobility was stressed in the early
workof John Conlisk (1977) and Glenn C. Lourv(1977),who usesthe concept of"social capital" to
analyze how racial discrimination influences the social mobility of blacks. Shelly Lundberg and Richard
Startz(1992) investigate how human capital externalities may alter the impact of antidiscrimination
programs on social mobility.2
Theprocessthrough which the ethnic externalities are transmitted, however, is not well
understood. Thispaperinvestigatesone possiblemechanism, ethnicneighborhoods.The insight
that human capita! externalities and geography are linked is not new. In his pathbreaking work,
Robert E. Lucas (1988) cites the crowding of similarly skilled workers into a small number of city
blocks as a key detenninant of the economic development of cities. Similarly, William Julius
Wilson's (1987) influential work on the creation and growth of the underclass argues that blacks
who live in poor neighborhoods are not exposed to "mainstream" role models, thus hampering the
economic mobility of blacks.
This paper presents an empirical study of the link between geography and ethnic
externalities. The analysis uses the 1/100 Neighborhood File of the 1970 Public Use Sample of
the U.S. Census and a specially-designed version of the National Longitudinal Surveys of' Youth
(NLSY). The Census data groups workers into one of over 40,000 neighborhoods, while the
NLSY file groups workers into one of 1,978 zip codes. Hence it is possible to determine the
extent to which ethnic groups segregate in particular neighborhoods, and the impact of this
segregation on the process of human capital accumulation and intergenerational mobility.2
The main finding of the analysis is that residential segregation and the influence of ethnic
capital on the process of intergenerational mobility are intimately linked. In particular, the impact
of ethnic capital on the skills of the next generation arises partly because the ethnic capital variable
is an excellent proxy for the socioeconomic background of the neighborhood where the children
2Thc role played by neighborhood effects in determining socioeconomic outcomcs is currently the
subject of intensive research; see, for instance, the survey of Christopher Jencks and Susan E. Meycr
(1990) and the critical appraisal by Charles F. Manski (1993). Empirical evidence linking
neigbborhood effects to teenage pregnancy, criminal behavior, educational attainment, and human
capital accumulation is given by Anne C. Case and Lawrence F. Katz (1991), Mary Corcoran, Roger
Gordon, Deborah Laren and Gary Solon (1992), Jonathan Crane (1991), and James E. Rauch (1992).3
wereraised, and these neighborhood characteristics influence intergenerational mobility: In other
words, the ethnic capital model provides an alternative wa of capturing neighborhood effects.
Ethnic capital, however, plays an additional role in intergenerational mobility. Even among
persons who grow up in the same neighborhood, ethnic capital matters when children are
frequently exposed to other persons who share the same ethnic background.
I.Ethnicity and Neighborhoods
Becauselittle is known about the residential clustering of many of the ethnic groups used
in the empirical analysis below, it is usefUl to first document the link between ethnicity and
residential segregation.3 The descriptive analysis is based initially on data drawn from the 1/100
Neighborhood file of the 1970 U.S.Census(15 percent questionnaire). These data not only
contain the individual-level demographic variables typically available in Census files, but also
group individuals into one of 42,950 "neighborhoods." Neighborhoods are contiguous, relatively
compact, roughly the size of a Census tract, and have an average population of 4,000 persons
(U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1973). Although the specific geographic location ofa neighborhood
cannot be determined (other than its location in one of the nine Census regions), the data file
reports a number of demographic characteristics describing the neighborhood (such as the fraction
of persons who are either first- or second-generation Americans, and the fraction of persons who
are college graduates).
3A large literature documents the extent of residential segregation among blacks and Hispanics: see
Frank D. Scan and Marta Tienda (1987), Nancy A. Denton and Douglas S. Massey (1989).Mark Alan
Hughesand Janice Fanning Madden (1991), and Scott McKinney and Ann B. Schnare (1989).4
I restrict the analysis to persons aged 18-64. 1 begin by documenting the residential
segregation of immigrants and second-generation Americans, and the extent to which residential
segregation changes across generations. A person is an immigrant if he or she was born outside
the United States (or its possessions), and is a second-generation American if either parent was
born outside the United States. All other persons are grouped and labeled "third-generation"
Americans, although this sample obviously includes higher-order generations. The 1970 Census
does not provide any information on the ethnic ancestry of persons in the "third" generation.
As noted above, the neighborhood file reports the proportion of the population in each
neighborhood that is either first- or second-generation. This statistic was calculated by the
Bureau of the Census using all available observations in the neighborhood (i.e., the 15 percent
sample of respondents who filled out the relevant questionnaire). I use these data to estimate the
fraction of persons in the neighborhood who are either first- or second-generation for the average
person in a number of demographic groups.
Table I summarizes the extent of residential segregation. The first row reports that the!
average immigrant resided in a neighborhood where 32.7 percent of the population was either
first- or second-generation. This pattern of residential location differs significantly from what one
would expect if immigrants were randomly allocated across neighborhoods. The 1970 Census
indicates that only 16.6 percent of the population was first- or second-generation.
Because the aggregate characteristics reported in the neighborhood file do not include the
proportion of the neighborhood's population that is foreign-born, I calculate this statistic by
combining the birthplace data reported in each individual's record with the aggregate5
neighborhood characteristics provided by the Census Bureau.4 The typical immigrant lives in a
neighborhood that is 15.3 percent immigrant, even though only 4.8 percent of the population was
foreign-born.
Residential segregation persists into the second generation. As the second row of Table I
shows, the average second-generation American resides in a neighborhood that is 28.2 percent
first- or second-generation.
The 1970Censusdoes not provide any information on ancestry past the second
generation. As a result, I cannot determine how the pattern of residential segregation changes
beyond the second generation for most groups. Intergenerational changes in residential
segregation, however, can be documented for the subpopulation of Hispanics, the vast majority of
whom are foreign-born or have parents or grandparents who are foreign-born.3 Table I indicates
that there is very little movement of Hispanics out of Hispanic neighborhoods even in the third
generation. The average Hispanic immigrant lives in a neighborhood that is 35 percent Hispanic;
the second-generation Hispanic lives in one that is 33 percent Hispanic; and the typical third-
generation Hispanic lives in one that is 29 percent Hispanic. The fraction of Hispanics in the
population is only 4.4 percent. The clustering of Hispanics into Hispanic neighborhoods,
(therefore, is prevalent and persistent.6
N
41nparticular, I taketheCensus Bureau estimate of the proportion of personsinthe neighborhood who
arefirst- or second-generation to be the population proportion. I then multiply this number by the
sample estimate of the proportion of the first- and second-generation persons in the neighborhood who
are foreign-born.
'Calculations from[heGeneralSocial Surveys indicate that over 90 percentofpersons whoclassify
themselves as Hispanic are foreign-born, have parents who are foreignborn, or have grandparents who
are foreign-born.
6Although the residentiat segregation found among these ethnic groups is substantial, it is not nearly as
striking as that found among blacks. Table I reports that the avenge black lives in a neighborhood that
is54.7percent black.6
In addition to the clustering of first- and second-generation persons into certain
neighborhoods, there is substantial segregation by ethnic group. To document the differences
across national origin groups, I focus on the 39 largest groups in the data. These 39 groups
include 83.7 percent of all first-generation Americans, and over 9 percent of all second-
generation Americans. The national origin of immigrants is, of course, determined by their
country of birth. The national origin of a second-generation person is determined by the father's
birthplace (unless only the mother was foreign-born, in which case it is determined by the
mother's birthplace). Table 2 lists the 39 national origin groups used in the analysis.
I first calculated the proportion of the population who are either first- or second-
generation and who have a particular ethnic ancestry. This number is reported in the first column
of the table, and represents the probability that a first- or second-generation person from that
group will be found in a particular neighborhood if the ethnic group was distributed randomly
across neighborhoods. Most of the groups make uprelatively small fractions of the population:
only 0.8 percent of the population, for instance, is first- or second-generation Irish.
Table 2 reveals that immigrants and their children, regardless of national origin, cluster in
neighborhoods that have large numbers of first- or second-generation Americans. The typical
second-generation person of English ancestry resides in a neighborhood that is 23.5 percent first-
or second-generation; the respective statistic for Irish persons is 31.3 percent. for Italians 32.0
percent, and for Mexicans 27.8 percent. There is little evidence, therefore, that only economically
disadvantaged groups are crowded into ethnic neighborhoods.
To document how type-f ethnics cluster in specific neighborhoods, I calculate the fraction
of the neighborhood's population that has the same ethnicity as theaverage type-f person. The
Census Bureau does not report the fraction of the population in each neighborhood that belongs7
toeach of the groups. Hence I calculated this statistic from within the 1/100 sample. Because the
family members of a type-fethnicarelikelyto be type-f ethnics, and because the 1/100 Censusfile
is a random sample ofhouseholds the stratified sampling scheme introduces an upward bias in the
calculationofthe fraction of the nighborhood's population that is typef. Ichoose aconservative
index of within-group residential segregation, and calculate (for eachpersonin the data) the
proportionof persons inthe neighborhood who reside outside the household unit and whoare
type-fethnics.7Table2reportsthe average of this statistic for eachof the groups. Inviewofthe
relativelysmall sample size available for each neighborhood (the mean and median number of
observations in a neighborhood is 26, andtheinterquartile range is 9, from 21 to 30), some
caution is required in the interpretation of the data.
The probability that type-f ethnics live near other type-f ethnics is much higher than one
would expect iftype-fethnics were randoniiy distributed across neighborhoods. Among second-
generation workers, the typicalpersonofIrishancestrylivesin a neighborhood that is 3.3 percent
Irish, although first- and second-generation Irishmakeup only 0.8 percent of the population; the
typicalItalian livesin aneighborhoodthatis 12.1percent Italian,althoughItalians make uponly
2.8 percent of thepopulation;and the typical Mexicanlivesin aneighborhoodthat is 18.1 percent
Mexican,althoughMexicansmakeup only 1.3 percent of thepopulationAmong the 39national
origingroups,the typicalimmigrantlives in a neighborhoodinwhich 83percent ofthe
population shares the same ethnicbackground,and the typical second-generation person lives in a
neighborhood in which 6.6 percent of the populationsharesthe same background.
7This methodology does not entirely solve the problem because extended family members are also likely
to be type-f ethnics and to live in the same neighborhood (but as part of a different household unit).8
I conclude the descriptive analysis of the Census data by documenting that ethnic
residential segregation exists across a number of demographic and skill groups. Table 3 shows
that there is little difference in ethnic residential segregation across age groups. The typical
second-generation person aged 18-34 resides in a neighborhood that is 27.4 percent first- or
second-generation, while the respective statistic for an older person is 28.5 percent. In addition,
the differences in residential segregation across education groups are often small. The typical
high school dropout in the second generation lives in a neighborhood that is 28.7 percent first- or
second-generation, while the respective statistic for the typical college graduate is 27.8 percent.
Finally, the data indicate that internal migration decisions among first- and second-generation
Americans do not seem to alter the ethnic composition of their residential environment. Second-
generation persons who have lived in the same house for over 10 years live in a neighborhood that
is 29.4 percent first- or second-generation, while the respective statistic for persons who have
lived in the house fewer than 3 years is 26.3 percent.
The NLSY reveals even stronger patterns of residential segregation. The analysis uses a
version of the NLSY that identifies the subset of persons who resided in the same zip code in
1979, at the time the survey of young persons (aged 14-22) began. Hence it is possible to
determine if NLSY respondents live near other NLSY respondents who share the same ethnic
background.
Thenumbering systemused to identifyzip codesin the NLSY file differs from that used by ihe Postal
Service. Although the data indicatewhichsubset ofNLSYrespondentsliveinthe same postalarea, it is
impossible to locate the zip code within a particular metropolitan area. Because the zip code refers to
the 1979 residence, many of the respondents were still living in the parental household,. As a result, the
residential segregation measures inthe NLSYtend to reflect the ethnic environment in which the
respondentswereraised.9
Ethnicity is determined from the response to the question: "What is your origin or
descent?" Although most persons in the NLSY gave only one response to the question, about
one third of the respondents gave multiple answers. In these cases, I used the main ethnic
background (as identified by the respondent) to classi& people into ethnic categories.
For each person in the data, I calculated the probability that other NLSY respondents in
the zip code had the same ethnic background. The NLSY, however, surveyed other persons in
the family unit who were in the "correct" age range (i.e., 14-22 in 1979). As a result, there are a
large number of siblings in the data: 27 percent of the respondents have one sibling, and an
additional 19 percent have at least two siblings. To avoid the bias introduced by this sampling
scheme, I calculated the residential segregation measures on the sample of non-related persons
who reside outside the household unit.9 Moreover, because the NLSY oversampled blacks and
other minorities, I used the sampling weights in the calculations.
The segregation indices are reported in Table 4 far the 25 ethnic groups identifiable in the
Thereis strong evidence of residential segregation. The average black lived in a
neighborhood that was 63.4 percent black, while the average Mexican lived in a neighborhood
that was 50.3 percent Mexican. Overall, the typical NLSY respondent lived in a neighborhood
where 30.4 percent of other non-related respondents shared a common ethnic background.''
9Toreducecosts, the NLSY alsosampledhouseholdswhichresided geographically close to each other.
Thissampling strategysuggests that themeasuresofresidential segregation calculatedinthese data
probably overstatethetrueextent of segregation.
1001 the 12,686 observationsinthe 1979 wave of the NLSY, I deleted 2 persons because theyhad
invalidzipcodes, and939 persons because they had invalid ethnic classifications.
11As with the Census data, the NLSY residential segregation measures should be interpreted with
caution. There arefewer than100observationsfor 11 ofthe 25ethnic groups.10
Notethat this statistic is much larger than the respective statistic in the Census data, where
only7 to8 percent of the neighborhood's population belonged to the same group. The Census
results, however, underestimate the extent of residential segregation because all third-generation
workers are classified as non-ethnics (because no information is provided on the ethnic
backgroundof third-generationpersons). As a result, even though the typical immigrant in the
Censuslivesin a neighborhoodwhere 8.3 percent ofthe population is composed of first- or
second-generationpersons who belong to the same ethnic group, a much larger fraction of the
neighborhood's population might be composed of third-generation workers who also belong to
the same ethnic group. The NLSY avoids this problem because all persons in the data (regardjess
of their generation) report their ancestry.
ILEconometric Framework
Myobjectiveis to determine the relationship between ethnic externalities and
neighborhood effects in the intergenerationaltransmission process. The econometric model
underlying theanalysis is givenby:
(I)
wherey,1 measures the skills (such as educational attainment or the log wage) of person iinethnic
groupj; x givestheskills of his father andgivesthe average skills of theethnicgroup in the
father's generation (which I call ethnic capital). Note that Y,. takes on the same value for all
persons in groupj. All variables are measured in deviations from the mean.11
Equation(I)canbederived from a model whereutility-maximizing parents invest in their
children, andwhere ethnicity has an external effect on the production ofchildren's skills(Boijas,
1992). Maresult of the ethnicspillover,the human capital of children depends not only on
parental inputs (asmeasured by the exogenoushumancapital of theparents), but alsoonthe
externaleffect of ethnicity, as summarized by the average skills of the ethnic group.
Thespillovereffects underlying theethnic capital model havemuchin common with the
human capitalexternalitiesthat areattheheartof the recent literatureoneconomic growth
(Lucas, 1988; Paul M.Romer, 1986), as well as withthe notions ofsocial capitaland
neighborhood effects that are stressed routinely in the sociology literature (James S. Coleman,
1988, 1990; Wilson,1987).If the ethnic externality is sufficiently strong, skill differentials
observed among ethnic groups can persist for many generations and may never disappear. Note
that the expected skills of the son of the average father in ethnic groupj are given by:
(2)
The sum f3 + 2' therefore, determines if the mean skills of ethnic groups converge across
generations; hence f31 + 13215 an inverse measure of the rate of "mean convergence."2 If the sum
of coefficients is less than one, ethnic differences converge over time; if it is greater than one,
ethnic differences diverge across generations.
12RobcrtI.Barro and Xavier Sala-i-Martin (1992)provide adiscussion of alternative concepts of
convergcnce in the context of growth models.12
As we have seen, ethnic groups cluster in particular neighborhoods. This clustering
suggeststhat part oftheethnic capital effectin equation (I) may be capturing the iniluence (if
thereis one) oftheneighborhood's socioeconomic background on intergenerational mobility.
Suppose, for example, that ethnic groups are completely segregated so that there is one ethnic
group per neighborhood. The ethnic capital variablewould then also represent the mean skills
oftheneighborhood, and the coefficient 132 in (1) would capturethetotal impact oftheethnic
spillover and of the neighborhood's socioeconomic background. The coefficient of ethniccapital
would be significant even if ethnicitydidnot have a direct impact on intergenerational mobility,
but neighborhood characteristics mattered.
The data do not exhibit this extreme type ofsegregation.Ethnic groups, however, are
likelytocluster byskilllevel,so thatunskilled ethnic groups livetogetherinlow-income
neighborhoods and skilled ethnic groups live inhigh-income neighborhoods.The ethnic capital
variablewould again be correlated with the skill level of the neighborhood, and the ethnic capital
coefficientcould becapturing neighborhood effects (i.e., the impact ofthe neighborhood'soverall
socioeconomicbackground), ratherthan the direct effect of ethnicity.Ineffect,theethnic capital
model"works" becauseethniccapitalproxiesforthe relevantneighborhood characteristics which
influence the intergenerational transmission process. If ethnicitydidnot have a direct impact on
intergenerational mobility, controlling for the relevant neighborhood characteristics (such asmean
income and education) would drive the ethnic capitalcoefficientdown to zero.
Ethnic capital might still matter, above and beyond neighborhood effects, if intra-group
contacts withina neighborhood are more frequent or are more influential than inter-group13
contacts.'3Children whobelong to ethnic groupj are then exposed to a different set of values,
social contacts, and economic opportunities than children who belong to other ethnicgroups but
who grow up in the same neighborhood. In effect, the aggregate socioeconomic characteristics of
the neighborhood are not a sufficient statistic summarizing the environment facing type-fpersons.
As a result, ethnic capital influences the intergenerational mobility process even after controlling
for neighborhood effects. Ethnicity per se has an impact on intergenerational mobility.
The empirical work presented in this paper decomposes the impact of the ethnic capital
coefficient into neighborhood effects (the extent to which the ethnic capital variable proxies for
neighborhood characteristics which influence all persons who reside in the same neighborhood,
regardless of ethnic background) and into an ethnic effect. A simple way of determining the
extent to which the impact of ethnic capital (i.e., the coefficient 132) operates through
neighborhood effects is to expand the model in (1) to include a vector of neighborhood fixed
effects:
(3)
whereis a dummy variable set to unity if person i in ethnic groupj resides in neighborhood k.
Theparameter vector (0.•"8) gives the neighborhood fixed effects, which are assumed to be
t3Richard D, Alba's (1990) study of social contacts among 1J.S.-born white ethnics indicates that half of
all non-related childhood fricnds belong to the same ethnic group. Harry J. Hoizer (I 988) has shown
thatfriends are a key source of information about job opportunities, so that intra-group referrals play a
major role in the job search process and might explain the concentration of some ethnic groups in
narrowly-definedoccupations.14
exogenous.'4 The coefficients 8 and 2 measure the within-neighborhood impact ofparental
skillsand of ethnic capital. As long as neighborhoods matter in the transmission of skills, the
"net" rate of mean-convergence (i.e., net of neighborhood effects) implied by the fixed-effects
model, 8 + 8,, is conceptually different from the "gross" rate implied by equation (1),+
Equations (1) and (3) can be estimated directly in the NLSY data discussed above. It is
unusual, however, to come across data that contain all the requisite information: ethnicity, the
skills of two generations of workers, and neighborhood of residence. Nevertheless, a relatively
complete analysis of the relationship between ethnic capital and neighborhood effects can be
conducted even if the data do not provide any information on parental background (as is the case
with the 1970 Census neighborhood file). In particular, suppose mean parental skills in thegroup,
are observed even if parental skills are not (the source of the data onwill be discussed
below). The individual-level data available for second-generation workers in the 1970 Census can
then be used to estimate the regression models:
(4) y,,=j3i+co,
(5)
Because equations (4) and (5) regress individual-level data on anaggregate measure of ethnic
skills, I call this type of model a "semi-aggregate" regression. It iseasy to show that:
'41t would be interesting to analyze how parents choose thetype and intensity of "ethnicity" that the
wish to e.'cpose to their children. William N. Evans, Wallace E. Oates, and Robert M. Schwab(1992)
show that endogenhing the "peer group" effects greatly weakens therelationship between outcomes and
neighborhood characteristics.15
Proposition 1. EQ3)=31I2
Dataon parentalskills,therefore, arenotrequired to estimate the-gross rate of mean
convergence.Because the mean skills of the ethnic group instrument for parental skills,the
omittedvariable bias introduced by leaving out parental skillsis simply the "recovery"of the
coefficientj3.It wouldnowbe usefi.il to determineifE(6)=81 + sothat the net rate of mean
convergence canalso be estimated without information on parental skills.Iproceed to show that
thisisindeedthecase in an important special case, and that the difference between the gross and
netrates of mean convergence is attributable solely to the change in the ethnic capital coefficient.
Consider first how the coefficients of parental and ethnic capital in equation (1) change
when neighborhood fixed effects are introduced into the model. The probability limits of the






where=Var(x7)Var(71) —Var(,.)2;Pk15thefraction of the population that lives in
neighborhood Ic E(xI k)is the mean value of skills among parents who live in neighborhood k,16
where the expectation is evaluated over all iandj; andE(;.1k)is the mean value of the ethnic
capital variable among all persons who live in neighborhood k,wherethe expectation is again
evaluated over all I and).
In general, the introduction of neighborhood effects affects the coefficients of both
parental skills and ethnic capital. Suppose, however, that type-r ethnics residing in region karea
random sample of the population of type-x ethnics, so that the skill distribution of type-r ethnics
in region kisthe same as their skill distribution in the population. This assumption implies:
(8) E(xIk)=i
where the expectation in the left-hand-side is taken over all iingroup t in neighborhood k,while
the right-hand-side simply gives the level of ethnic capital for group t. i refer to (8) as the "skill-
invariance" assumption. Equation (8) implies E(x, Ik)=E( IA), Vk, so that the bracketed term
in (6) vanishes. It is usethl to summarize this result as:
Proposition2. Ifthe distribution of type-f ethnics across neighborhoods is skill-invariant,
plim =ö, and the coefficient of parental skills is unaffected by the introduction of
neighborhood fixed effects.
Notethat the skill-invariant geographic assignment of type) workers is distinct from and weaker
than assuming that type-f ethnics are distributed randomly across neighborhoods.17
The skillinvariance assumption isalso useflulindetermining the relationship between the
estimator 6 (from equation (5)) and the net rate of mean convergence. Thisrelationship is
summarized by:
Proposition 3. If the distribution of type-j ethnics across neighborhoods is skill-invariant, then
plimô=61 +6.
As before, it is unnecessary to have information on parental skills in order to estimate therate of
mean convergence (net of neighborhood effects).
The results can now be used to determine why the two rates of meanconvergence
estimable in Census data might differ. Because the coefficient of parental skills is unaffectedby
the introduction of neighborhood fixed effects, the difference between the "gross" and "net"rates
of mean convergence is attributable entirely to the change in the coefficient of the ethniccapital
variable (assuming the skill invariance assumption holds). Therefore, the inclusion of
neighborhood fixed effects into semi-aggregate regressions can be used to assess the relationship
between ethnic capital and geography. I summarize this result as:
Proposition 4. Suppose the distribution of type-f ethnics is skill-invariant. The difference in the
estimated rates of mean convergence Iand3 gives the impact of neighborhood effects on the
ethnic capital coefficient.18
Because of the practical importance of these results, it is worth stressing that the skill
invariance assumption is unlikely to hold strictly in the data. The analysis of the Census data
presented below uses two alternative measures of skills (educational attainment and log wages) to
estimate the rate of mean convergence. Even if there were no skill differentials among type-j
workers residing in different neighborhoods, the restriction in (8) would be violated if there exist
neighborhood wage differentials which are independent of skills. These differentials imply that the
mean wage of type-f parents in a particular neighborhood differs from the measure of ethnic
capital for groupj. Therefore, the analysis must control for regional wage differentials prior to
applying the results presented above. The construction of an index of regional wage differentials
at the neighborhood level is discussed below.
A more difficult problem with the skill-invariance assumption is simply that the skill
distribution of type-f ethnics probably does differ across neighborhoods.'3 I will show below,
however, that the restriction implied by skill invariance is not grossly inconsistent with the
geographic sorting of type-f ethnics.
Finally, the discussion has assumed that the ethnic capital effect is constant across
neighborhoods and persons. This need not be the case. In fact, the ethnic capital model implies
that the spillover effects of ethnicity should be larger for persons who are more frequently
131tiseasy to determine how the coefficients of parental skills and ethnic capital change when
neighborhood effects are introduced into the model and the skill invariance assumption does not bold.
Suppose that highly-skilled type-f workers move intowealthy neighborhoods,and unskilled type-f
workers move into poor neighborhoods. This impliesthat E(x I)> E(1It)in wealthy
neighborhoods (1) and that E(x1k)c E(1k) inlow-income neighborhoods (k). It follows from
equation (6) that E(,)=5, +p,where p >0. Thus the nonrandom sorting of skilled workers into
"good" neighborhoods magnifies the impact of the parental contribution to the children's skills. As a
result, the inclusion of neighborhood effects will reduce the coefficient of parental skills in the
intergenerational transmission equation. It is also easy to show that this type of nonrandom sorting
leads to a smaller ethnic capital coefficient in models which omit the neighborhood fixed effects.19
exposed to an ethnicenvironment.Put differently, the ethnic capital effect should be larger for
those children who grow up in neighborhoods where many of the residents share the same ethnic
background. The empirical analysis presented below investigates the extent to which the ethnic
capital effeät depends on the ethnic composition of the neighborhood.
111. Results
I initially use the sample of second-generation workers in the 1970 Census file to analyze
the relationship between ethnic externalities and neighborhood effects. I restrict the analysis to
second-generation men aged 18-64, who worked in the civilian sector in the year prior to the
Census, who were not enrolled in school, and who. were not self-employed. As before, the ethnic
group of the second-generation worker is defined in terms of the father's birthplace (unless only
the mother was foreign-born, in which case it is defined in terms of the mother's birthplace). I use
two alternative measures of the worker's skills, educational attainment and log wage rates.
Because Census data do not directly link the skills of second-generation Americans with
the skills of their immigrant parents, I use the 1/100 Public Use Sample of the 1940 Census to
estimate the mean skills of the national origin group in the parent's generation. It is likely that
(adult) second-generation persons enumerated in the 1970 Census are the children of the
immigrants who arrived in the period prior to 1940,16
16Boijas (1993) discusses the methodologof intercensal comparisons that underlie the empirical
analysis using the Census data. The intercensal linkage between parents and children can be improved
by focusing on workers in specificagegToups. For example, thechildren ofimmigrants aged 25-44 in
1940 are likely to be relatively young in 1970. I experimented with a number of alternative age
breakdowns and obtained similar results.20
Table 5 reports the averageeducationalattainment arid log wages for the 36 ethnic groups
that can be identified in both the 1940 and 1970 Censuses with sufficiently large numbers of
observations. These 36 ethnic groups make up 97.4 percent of working immigrant men in 1940,
and 95.5 percent of the second-generation working men in 1970. There is substantial dispersion
in skills and wages across national origin groups and there is a strong positive correlation between
the skills of the immigrant group in 1940 and the skills of the corresponding second-generation
group in 1970.
To calculate the variable measuring mean skills in the parent's generation (i.e., the
empirical measure of ethnic capital), I pool the sample of immigrant and native men in the 1940
Census (for a total of 231,606 observations), and estimate the regression model:
(9)
where x, gives the skills of person i in national origin groupj;is a vector of socioeconomic
characteristics including age, age squared, and region of residence; andis a dummy variable set
to unity if person i belongs to groupj (natives are the omitted group). The regression is estimated
separately using educational attainment and the log wage rate as dependent variables. The
parameter vector (•••,i,) gives the empirical measure of ethnic capital for theigroups.
Table 6 reports the estimated rates of mean convergence. Equations (4) and (5) give the
basic specification of the model, except that the regressions also control for the second-generation
worker's age and age squared. The regressions use a random-effects estimator which allows for21
an ethnic group-specificcomponentin the error term.'7 Consider initially the middle panel
reporting the transmission coefficients obtained in the log wage regression model. Column I
indicates that the rate of mean convergence (or I3 + 132 in terms of the mode! in the previous
section) is 0.45, in line with the results of earlier work (Eorjas, 1992, 1993).
The next column controls for the bias introduced by regional wage differentials. As noted
above, the skill-invariance assumption is violated if some ethnic groups have relatively high wage
levels simply because they live in high-wage areas. To control for regional wage variation, I
estimated the following regression in the sample of third generation workers in the 1970
neighborhood file:
(10)
wherew, gives the log wage of person I; Xis a vector of standardizing variables (including
educational attainment, age, age squared, marital status, and dummy variables indicating if the
person is black or Hispanic); and Dtisa dummy variable indicating if person i resides in
neighborhood k.Thevector (v1,• w4) gives the skill-adjusted neighborhood wage level. This
wage level is included as an additional regressor in the intergenerational earnings equations, and
the resulting transmission coefficient is reported in column 2 of Table 6.' The transmission
coefficient falls to 0.40 (a drop of about 0.05 units).
in particular, the residual = vj + up where is the group component. It is welt known that
ignoring the group component in the error term seriously underestimates the standard error of the ethnic
capitalcoefficient.
'8The coefficient of the neighborhood wage level was typically in the 0.4 to 0.5 range.22
Column 3of thetable adds the vectorof neighborhood fixed effects into the regression)9
Controllingfor the neighborhood fixed effects reduces the estimated transmission parameter
substantially, to about 0.2. Assuming that the skill-invariance assumption holds, the transmission
coefficient changes because the estimate in column 3 "nets out" the relationship between the
ethnic externality and neighborhood effects (but leaves unchanged the impact of parental skills).
It is interesting to note that the resulting coefficient of 0.2 is roughly the same as the coefficient of
parental capital in my earlier work (Boijas, 1992). It seems as if neighborhood effects account for
most (if not all) of the ethnic influence in the intergenerational transmission process. Ethnic
capital seems to be a very good proxy for the relevant characteristics of the neighborhood's
economic and social environment which influence the intergenerational transmission process gp4
'-which are common to all persons living in the same neighborhood, regardless of ethnicity."
The last three columns of Table 6 usethe 1/100CountyGroup file of the 1970 Public Use
Sample (15 percent questionnaire) to estimate an identical model in a sample of second-generation
t9There are 53,703 observations in the sample of second-generation working men and 23,415
neighborhoods. There are 9,522 neighborhoods with only one observation; 5,895 neighborhoods with
two; 3,616 neighborhoods with three; 2,162 neighborhoods with 4; and 1,161 neighborhoods With 5.
The remaining 5 percent of the neighborhoods have between 6 and 12 observations. Despite the fact
that a sizable number of neighborhoods have only 1 observation, the estimated rate of mean convergence
is consistent. I use a two-stage procedure to estimate the random effects model which includes the
vector of neighborhood fixed effects. The first stage regression includes age, age squared, and a vector
of ethnic fixed effects. This regression is estimated on a data set where all variables are differenced
form the respective neighborhood means. This procedure is numerically equivalent to introducing the
neighborhood fixed effects. The second stage then uses a GLS estimator to estimate the relationship
between the coefficients of the first-stage ethnic dummy variables and the ethnic capital variable.
20The discussion assumes that the neighborhood of current residence is the same as the neighborhood
where the individual was raised. Because of the misdefinition of the neighborhood. the results confound
the ethnic externalities that influenced the human capital accumulation process with externalities that
arise front living in an ethnic neighborhood at the present lime. This problem, however, does not seem
to be very important. The results are vety similar for two alternative skill variables, log wages and
educational attainment (which presumably was completed at an early age). Moreover, the transmission
coefficients are roughly the same regardless of how long the person has lived in his current residence.
The estimated transmission parameter is 0.43 for persons who moved to the house prior to 1960. and is
0.46 for persons who moved to the house after 1967.23
workers defined exactly as incolumns1-3. This Census filereports the metropolitan area (instead
ofthe neighborhood) of current residence. Persons who live outside metropolitan areas are
grouped into economically similar "county groups." A total of 408 metropolitan areas and county
groups are identified in the data.
Not surprisingly, the transmissioncoefflcient reported in column 5isalmost identical to
the respective statistic in column 1. To control for regional wage variation, I estimated a
regression in the sample of third-generation workers similar to (10) with county group dummies
instead of neighborhood dummies. The skill-adjusted county wage level was then introduced as
an additional regressor in the model. This reduced the coefficient to about 0.37, which is roughly
the same as the analogous coefficient in column 2.
The coefficient in the last column of Table 6, however, differs drastically from the
respective coefficient in column 3. Controlling for county fixed effects barely affects the
estimated transmission coefficient; it remains at about 0.4. Put differently, the ethnic capital
variable and the vector of county fixed effects are uncorrelated. There is no evidence, therefore,
that ethnic capital has anything to do with geography at the county level. At the neighborhood
level, however, geography is intimately linked to the ethnic capital effect.2'
The top panel of Table 6 reports the transmission coefficients obtained from regressions
which use the worker's educational attainment as the dependent variable. The results are virtually
identical to those obtained in the log wage regressions. Including the neighborhood fixed effects
21A regression of education (or log wages) on a vector of countiy group dummieshas anR-squaredof
about 0.09, so that 91 percent of the variance in education and log wages is attributable to within-county
variation. In contrast, only about 45 percent of the variance in these variables is attributable to within-
neighborhood variation.24
reduces the transmission coefficient from 0.36 to 0.17, while adding in the county dummies barely
changes the estimated parameter (it declines to O.33).22
Finally, the bottom panel of Table 6 reports the transmission coefficients obtained in a log
wage regression which also includes the educational attainmentof the second-generation worker
as a regressor. Although the transmission rates are much smaller (because the transmission that
occurs through educational attainment is netted out), adding neighborhood fixed effects changes
the estimated coefficients in exactly the same way an in the top two panels of the table.
In sum, the analysis reveals a link between ethnic capital and neighborhood effects, but it
provides no information about which set of neighborhood characteristics are being proxied by the
ethnic capital variable. Column 4 of Table 6 shows that the neighborhood fixed effects can be
summarized in terms of a small number of neighborhood characteristics. The neighborhood
characteristics included in the regression are: the percent of the neighborhood's population that
has at least a high school diploma; the percent that has at least a college diploma; the labor force
participation rates of men and women; the unemployment rate; the percent of workers employed
in professional occupations; the percent of families below the poverty level; and the percent of
families with at least $15,000 in household income. All of these neighborhood characteristics
were calculated by the Census Bureau (and are included in the Public Use Sample).
The inclusion of these aggregate neighborhood characteristics reduces the transmission
coefficient from 0.36 to 0.27 in the education regressions, and from 0.4 to 0.25 in the log wage
regressions. In other words, a small vector of variables that are common to all persons living in
22ause education differencesacrossneighborhoods almost entirely reflect true differencesinskill
levels,I did not attemptan analogous construction ofa "skill-adjusted" neighborhood education level.25
the neighborhood, regardless of ethnic background,can explain over half of the drop in the ethnic
capital coefficient.23
It seems, therefore, that a large part of the impact of ethniccapital is simply disguising for
neighborhood effects which have nothing to do with ethnicity. Thisinterpretation of the results,
of course, depends on the validity of the skill-invarianceassumption, As shown in Section II,
when the distribution of persons across neighborhoods is
skill-invariant, including neighborhood
effects in semi-aggregate regressions reduces the estimatedrate of mean convergence solely
because the ethnic capital coefficient is "standing in" forneighborhood effects,
Parental skills are not observed in the Census data,so that it is not possible to assess
directly the validity of the skill-invariance assumption. I cantest, however, if the geographic
distribution of second-generation workers rejects the skill-invarianceassumption. Consider the
following regression model:
(Ii) .Y,jk = y0G+'y1(G XD)+s,ft,
whereyYk gives the skills of second-generation worker i in groupj in neighborhood/r, G gives a
vector of dummy variables indicating the worker's ethnicgroup; and D gives a vector of dummy
variables indicating the worker's neighborhood. The skill invarianceassumption states that the
mean skills of a worker in ethnic group) are independent of the
neighborhood of residence, so
that the coefficient vector y1 is zero.
23Afthough I do not report or discuss the estimated coefficients of theneighborhood characteristics, it
would be interesting to study how (and why) these variouscharacteristics influence the intergenerational
transmission process.26
I calculated the analysis of variance decomposition implied by (ii) using both the
educational attainment and log wage of workers in the second generation.24 To net out the
impact of regional wage differentials on the analysis, the worker's log wageis deflated by the
skill-adjusted neighborhood wage level defined earlier. Despite the very large samplesused in the
analysis, testing the hypothesis that the coefficient vector y1 differs from zero yieldsF-statistics
which are barely above the critical value oft; the F-statistic in the educational attainment
regression was 1.21, and the F-statistic in the log wage regression was 1.18. In contrast,the F-
statistic testing the significance of the group effect (i.e., whether the coefficient vector y0 was
zero) was 17.2 in the educational attainment regressions and 95.9 in the log wage regressions,
substantially above the critical value of I •4•23
I now use the NLSY (where parental skills are observed 4 where it is unnecessary to
maintain the skill invariance assumption) to confirm that there is a very strong link between
neighborhood effects and the ethnic capital coefficient. The analysis uses the 1990 wave of the
NLSY,by whichtime the respondents were aged 25-33 and only about 5 percent were still
enrolled in school. Equations (1) and (3) give the basic specifications of the models. The
regressions also control for age, gender, whether the person is a first- or second-generation
American, and whether the person was enrolled in school in 1990.
24The test excludes the 9,522 neighborhoods that have only I second-generation working man.
23A related way of assessing the importance of the skill-invariance assumption uses the concept of the
intracluster correlation (Kish, 1965; Cochran, 1977). This correlation is positive if the characteristics of
persons within a cluster are more closely related than those of persons randomly chosen from the
population. When the cluster is defined to be the ethnicgroup,the intracluster correlation is about 0.1
(forbotheducation and log wages). This correlation increases to 0.2 when the cluster is defined to be
type-f ethnics living in neighborhood k. Put differently, the neighborhood provides additional
infonnation about the skill dJstribuiion of persons in a particular ethnic group.27
As with the analysis of Census data, I use two measures of skills, educational attainment
andthe log wage rate. Each NLSY respondentin1979 reported the father's education and
occupation (which was coded usingthe 1970Census codes). I constructed a wagefor eachfather
bymatching the father's occupation codewith theaverage log wage in the occupation, as
reportedbythe 1970 Census.
Toobtaina measure ofethnic capital,I usedthe 1/1001980 U.S.Census to calculatethe
meaneducational attainment andmean log wage for each of the ethnic groupsinthe parents'
generation.26The Census data report the ancestral background of U.S-born residents (obtained
from questions resembling the self-reported ethnic background in the NLSY).Toincreasethe
probability that the average skills of theethnic milieu correspondedto that in which the NLSY
respondents were raised,I restrict the 1980 Census sample to men aged35-64.
Table7 reports the summary statistics of thevariablesused in the analysis. There are
sizable ethnic differentials in educational attainment and log wages among NLSYrespondentsand
theirparents.Table 8reportsthe estimates of theethnic capital model. The coefficients in the
first columnofthetoppanelrevealthat theeducational attainmentofNLSYrespondents depends
on both the father'seducationand on the meaneducationofthe ethnic group in the parent's
generation.Theestimated rateofmean convergenceis 0.44. Theintroductionofa vectorof5lO
countydummies inthe second column reduces both of the coefficientssomewhat; theparental
coefficient fallsfrom 0.24 to 0.2 and theethnic capitalcoefficient fallsfrom 0.20to0.14.Column
26The ethnic characteristicsarecalculatedusinga 20percent randomsample ofthe 5/100 A File of the
1980 Public Use Sample. I also constructed comparableethniccharacteristicsfromwithin the NLSY
itself.Althoughthe findingsdonot dependonwhich measureofethnic capital is used, I only report the
regressionsthatuse the Census measure (which are calculated over much larger samples and contain
less sampling error).28
3investigates the relationship between ethnic capital and neighborhoods by introducing a vector
1,937dummies indicating the zipcode of residence. The parental coefficient declines further
to 0.17 and the ethnic capital effect evaporates (the coefficient falls to 0.04). Net of
neighborhood effects, therefore, the rate of mean convergence is only 0.21, about half the size of
the gross rate, and the decline is mostly due to the weakening of the ethnic capital effect. The
NLSY results, therefore, strongly confirm the implications of the analysis of the Census
(__jghborhooddata."
Theremaining two panels of Table 8 reestimate the model using the (log) wage and the
adjusted wage. The estimate of the rate of mean convergence using the log wage is 0.70, which is
higher than the one found in the Census. The introduction of county dummies reduces the rate of
mean convergence to 0.57, with the ethnic capital coefficient remaining unchanged. Finally, the
introduction of neighborhood fixed effects reduces the coefficient of ethnic capital to 0.05, and is
statistically insignificant. Note, however, that the coefficient of parental capital has declined by
270fthe 1,937 zip codefixed effects includedin the educationalattainment regressions,there are900
zipcodeswithI observation, 256 with 2, 168 vith 3, 123 with 4, and the remainder have 5 or more
observations. Of the 1,453 zip codefixed effectsincluded in the log nge regressions, there are 733 zip
codes with I observation,223with 2, 140 with 3, 80 with 4, and the remainder have 5 or more
observations. A regression of educational attainment(orlog wages) of the NLSYrespondentson a
vector of zip code dummies has an R-squared of about 0.4, so that about 60 percent of the variance in
educational attainment and log wages can be attributed to within-zipcodevariation. Over 80 percentof
the variance in these variables, however, can be attributed to within-county variation.
"it is also possible to estimate Census-type semi-aggregate regressions on the NLSY data,so that the
regressions omit the worker's parental background. When educational attainment is the dependent
variable, the coefficient of the ethnic capitalvariable(and standarderror)is 0.438 (0.047) in the model
which does not include either county or neighborhood dummies; 0.329 (0.030) in the model which
includes county dummies; and 0.173 (0.029) in the model which includes zip code dummies. This
pattern of coefficients closely mirrors the results documented in the Census data. A similar pattern is
obtained in the log wage regressions.29
about 0.13 units, which indicates that the geographic distribution of NLSY respondentsis not
consistent with the skill-invariance assumption.29
The last column of Table 8 shows what happens to the parental and ethnic capital
coefficients when I introduce a small vector of neighborhood characteristics (rather than zip code
dummies) to control for neighborhood effects. Because the NLSY file does not contain any
population estimates of economic or social characteristics in the zip code, all neighborhood-
specific variables must be calculated from within the data and contain substantial sampling error.
I estimated the mean education and log wage of the parents ofNLSY respondents in each zip
code. Controlling for these two characteristics reduces the ethnic capital coefficient by about
0.05 units in the education regression and by almost 0.3 units in the log wage regression. As with
the Census, a small vector of neighborhood characteristics which are common to all persons living
in the neighborhood helps explain why the ethnic capital variable matters (particularly in the log
wage regressions).33
IV. Ethnic Capital and the Ethnic Composition of the Neighborhood
291n particular, highly-skilled type-f ethnics tend to cluster in wealthier neighborhoods, while less-
skilled type-f ethnics cluster in poorer neighborhoods.
3O is of interest to note that the results do not change substantially when the model is estimated on the
subsample of NLSY respondents who were aged 14 to 18yearsold at the time of the initial interview in
1979. The residential location decision for these young persons was probably made by their parents, so
that the neighborhood fixed effects are less likely to be endogenous. In the educational attainment
regressions which do not include neighborhood fixed effects, the parental coefficient (and standard
en'or) was 0.235 (0.009) and the ethnic capital coefficient was 0.097 (0.026). The inclusion of
neighborhood fixedeffectschanged the coefficients to 0.170(0.007) and 0.017 (0.032), respectively. In
the log wage regressions which do not include neighborhood fixed effects, the parental and ethnic
capital coefficients were 0.343 (.048) and 0.498 (0.111). Including neighborhood fixed effects changed
these coefficients to 0.202 (0.043) and 0.054 (0.160).30
Theevidence suggests that, to a large extent, the ethnic capital effect summarizes the
impact of neighborhood characteristics(common to all theresidents of the neighborhood) on the
intergenerational transmission process. In view of this result, it is worth asking if ethnicity per se
plays any role in intergenerational mobility, above and beyond the influence of parents and
neighborhoods:.
Ethnicity is likely to play a more important role among persons who grow up in a
segregated ethnic environment. After all, these persons will probably experience (and be
influenced by) more frequent social, cultural, and economic intra-group contacts. The analysis in
the preceding section ignored this implication of the model because it assumed that the ethnic
capital coefficient was constant across workers. To determine if ethnicity plays an independent
role among workers raised in segregated neighborhoods, I now allow the ethnic capital coefficient
to vary according to the extent of residential segregation in the neighborhood.
In particular, I interact both the ethnic capital variable and the parental skills variable
(when.available) with dummies indicating the proportion of persons in the neighborhood who
share the same ethnic background. The regression model also includes the dummy variables
indicating the proportion of the neighborhood's population who belong to the respondent's ethnic
group (so as to allow for different constant terms). Finally, I estimate the models both with and
without neighborhood fixed effects."
'i didnotinteract the neighborhood effects with the dummy variables describing the proportion of
persons in the neighborhood who have the same ethnic background as the worker. This restriction helps
toisolate the impact of ethnic capital among persons who live in the same neighborhood (and hence
were exposed to the same overall neighborhood characteristics). I also estimated the models by simply
interacting the fraction of persons in a neighborhood who have the same ethnicity with the relevant
variables and obtained qualitatively similar results. Table 9 indicates, however, that there are strong
nonlinearities in the relationship between the ethnic capital coefficient and the extent of residential
segregation. Moreover, there is a great deal of sampling error in the residential segregation statistics.
As a result, I prefer the specification that clusters persons into a small number of neighborhood types.31
The evidence is summarized in Table 9. Consider initially the results obtained from the
1970 Census file. Even after controlling for neighborhood effects, both the education and log
wage regressions show that the rate of mean convergence is larger among persons who live in
highly segregated neighborhoods. The education regressions, for.example, indicate that the net
rate of mean convergence is 0.15 for those who live in neighborhoods where none of the
neighbors share the same ethnic background; 0.23 for those who live in neighborhoods where at
most 15 percent of the population share the same ethnic background; and 0.27 for those who live
in neighborhoods where over 15 percent of the population has the same ethnic background.32 In
the log wage regressions, the respective statistics are 0.13, 0.29, and 0.38.
It is worth stressing that these estimates of the rate of mean convergence net out
neighborhood effects. If the impact of parental skills is constant across neighborhoods, the
evidence suggests that ethnicity might be playing an important role for persons who live in
segregated neighborhoods, above and beyond the influence of parents and neighborhoods.
This implication is partially confirmed by the analysis of the NLSY data, where the rate of
mean convergence can be decomposed into the parental and ethnic effects. The educational
attainment regressions, for instance, show that (even after controlling for neighborhood fixed
effects) the ethnic capital coefficient increases from 0.05 for children who grew up in areas where
fewer than 5 percent of the non-related neighbors have the same ethnic background to 0.12 for
32The results arc not sensitive to the particular definition of residential segregation. This particular
breakdown, as well as the breakdown of neighborhoods in the NLSY data, was chosen because it
provided a reasonable number of observations foreach typeof neighborhood. In the Census data, there
were 27,006 persons who lived in the most integrated neighborhoods, 18,676 who lived in the "mixed"
neighborhoods, and 8,021 who lived in the most segregated neighborhoods. In the NLSY education
regressions, the respective number of observations are 1,999, 2,506, and 3,064, while in the NLSY log
wage regressions, theyare1,189, 1,428,and1,644.32
children who grew up in areas where at least 33 percent of the neighbors share the same ethnicity.
Similarly,theethnic capital coefficient in the log wage regressions rises from 0.03 for those who
grew up in "integrated" neighborhoods to 0.14 for the children raised in the most "segregated"
neighborhoods (although many of these coefficients have large standard errors).
The NLSY results suggest that not only does the ethnic capital coefficient increase as the
neighborhood becomes more segregated, but also that the coefficient of parental skills decreases.
The log wage regressions, for instance, indicate that the parental coefficient (net of neighborhood
effects) declines from 0.32 for persons raised in the most integrated neighborhoods to 0.26 for
persons raised in the most segregated neighborhoods. The relative unimportance of parental skills
for persons raised in segregated neighborhoods might indicate that group influences "take over"
as the neighborhood becomes more segregated.
Because the coefficients of parental skills and ethnic capital move in different directions as
persons are raised in more segregated neighborhoods, the rate of mean convergence (net of
neighborhood effects) only increases slightly in the NLSY log wage regressions, from 0.35 for
persons living in integrated neighborhood to 0.40 for persons raised in segregated neighborhoods.
In the educational attainment regressions, however, the net rate of mean convergence is roughly
the same (around 0.25) across the various types of neighborhoods.
V. Ethnic Capital and Measurement Error
Many of the results presented in this paper are consistent with a different interpretation of
the ethnic capital effect. Suppose that parental skills are measured with error. The ethnic mean
then provides a very good instrument for parental skills. As a result, part of the parental influence
on intergenerational mobility would be captured by the coefficient of the ethnic capital variable,33
even if ethnic capital did not enter the model (see Borjas, 1992, for a formal derivationof the
biases introducedby measurementerror). The greater the noise-ta-signal ratio in parental skills,
the greater the ethnic capital coefficient.
This interpretation of the results is particularly important in light ofrecent evidence that
measurement error in parental skills imparts a sizable downward bias on the correlationbetween
the earnings of fathers and sans (Joseph G. Altonji and Thomas A.Dunn, 1991; Solon, 1992; and
David I Zimmerman, 1992). Prior to these studies, it wasgenerally believed that the coefficient
of parental skills in an intergenerational transmission equation wason the order of 0.2 (see, for
example, the survey by Gary S. Becker and Nigel Tomes, 1986). The recent studies, which
typically use panel data to average parental earnings over a number ofyears (and thus "wash out"
the measurement error introduced by transitory changes in earnings),report much higher
coefficients, on the order of 0.3 to 0.4.
The empirical results presented in this paper suggest transmission coefficients(as defined
by the rate of mean convergence) that are typically above 0.4. In fact, the rate of mean
convergence was roughly 0.5 to 0.7 for children raised in segregated neighborhoods. Taken at
face value, therefore, the evidence suggests that ethnic capital mightplay an important role even if
the intergenerational correlation between parents and children wasas high as 0,3 to 0.4.
The NLSY data permit a more detailed analysis of some of the biases introducedby
measurement error. As noted earlier, there are a large number of siblings in the data, with each
sibling independently reporting ethnic background, as well as the parent's education and
occupation. The correlation among the siblings' responses is high, but it is far from unity. For
example, the correlation between a sibling's report of the father's education and the father's
average educational attainment as reported by all other siblings is 0.9; the respective statistic for34
the father's occupational earnings is 0.8; and nearly 30 percent of the respondents identi& most
with an ethnic background which differs from the "main"ancestryreported by at least one other
sibling (although typically the other siblings report the alternative ancestry as a second or third
ethnic background). The availability of other sources of information on parental skills and ethnic
backgroundsuggests that these alternative measures of the variables can be used as instruments in
the intergenerational transmission equation. TheIVestimates of thetransmissionparameter can
then be used to assess thepracticalimportance ofthe biasintroducedby measurement error in
parentalskills and ethnic background.33
I restrict theanalysis to NLSYrespondentswho have at least one sibling in the data. For
those who haveonlyonesibling (58 percent of thesample), theinstrumentsaregivenby the
sibling'sresponse.Forthose who havemore than one sibling, the instruments are defined as the
averageresponseof all other siblings. The instruments are the average skills of the father (either
educationalattainment or log occupational wage) as reportedbytheothersiblingsinthedata, and
asetof dummyvariables indicating the ethnicbackgroundofthe othersiblings.34The regressions
usethe IV-random effects estimator proposedbyJerry A. Hausman and William B. Taylor
(1981)."
33Orley Ashenfelter and Man B. Krueger (1992)usethis methodology to analyze the impact of
measurement error in educational attainment on estimates of the rate of return to schooling. Their
analysis suggests that measurement error imparts a sizable downward bias on estimates of the rate of
return to schooling.
created a vector of dummy variables indicating the ethnic group reported by each sibling in the data.
The instrument is formed by avenging this vector over all other siblings, so that it can be interpreted as
the probability that the other siblings report a particular ethnic background.
35The model is estimated in two stages. In the first stage, the children's skills are regressed on the
father's skills, other explanatory variables (age, gender, etc.), and a vector of dummy variables
indicating the self-reported ethnic background. The first-stage model is estimated using instrumental
variables. The second stage consists of a GLS regression in which the estimated coefficients of the
ethnic dummy variables are regressed on the ethnic capital variable. The regressions that control for35
A comparisonofthe IV estimates in thefirstrow of Table 10 with the corresponding OLS
estimatesin Table 8 indicates that thecoefficientof parental skillsincreasesbothintheeducation
regression(from 0.24 to 0.28), and in the log wage regression (from 038 to 0.48). The results
also indicate that the IV estimates of the ethnic capital coefficient remain sizable and significant.
In particular, thE coefficients are 0.18 and 0.30 in the education and log wage regressions
respectively,only slightly below the OLS estimates reported in Table 8. It is evident, therefore,
that measurement error in parental skills or in ethnic background cannot account for the results..
The remaining rows of the table interact the measures of parental skills and ethnic capital
with dummy variables indicating the proportion of persons in the zip code who share the same
ethnic background as the worker. The coefficients in Table 10 resemble those reported earlier,
particularly in the education regressions. The coefficient of parental skills is smaller and the ethnic
capital coefficient is larger among workers who grew up in segregated neighborhoods (even after
controlling for neighborhood effects). The impact of parental education, for instance, declines
from 0.29 to 0.14 (in an IV model which includes neighborhood effects) for workers who live in
more segregated neighborhoods; while the ethnic capital coefficient rises from 0.01 to 0.17. In
view of the small samples sizes and large standard errors, however, many of these differences are
not very significant.36
neighborhood effects usea dataset which has been differenced from the within zip-code means in the
first stage.
36Although the evidence is not consistent with an explanation that stresses classical measurement error
in parental skills or ethnic background, there arc ocher measurement problems which may account for
some of the results. I have focused on a one-factor model where one particular type of skills (either
educational attainment or the log wage) is transmitted across generations. There is evidence that this
one-factor approach does not provide a satisfactory explanation of the process of intergenerational
mobility. Altonji and Dunn (1991) report that the correlation in earnings among siblings is larger than
would be expected given the size of the correlation between parents and children. This result suggests
that perhaps a vector of trails is being transmitted, so that the ethnic capital variable could be proxving
for an aggregate measure of these traits.36
VI.Summary
Itis increasingly evident that ethnic skill differentials tend to persist from generation to
generation. Part of the correlation arises because of the linkage between parental skills and the
skills of children: Even if ethnicity did not matter, the children of skilled parents are likely to have
above-average skills. This correlation, however, is not sufficiently high to account for the
sluggish rate at which the mean skills of ethnic groups converge overtime. To explain the slow
rate of convergence, recent work borrows from the new growth literature and stresses the
importance of ethnic externalities in the human capital accumulation process. This ethnic spillover
implies that the skills of ethnic children depend not only on parental skills, but also on the mean
skills of the ethnic group in the parent's generation. The intergenerational transmission of this
ethnic fixed effect explains why it takes a relatively long time for ethnic skill differentials to
converge.
This paper investigates the nature of the ethnic externality. The study focuses on one
possible channel through which the ethnic externality might operate, the ethnic neighborhood.
Using the Neighborhood File of the 1970 U.S.Censusand the National Longitudinal Surveys of
Youth, I documented substantial residential segregation by ethnicity. Even though only 16.6
percent of the population in 1970 was first- or second-generation, the typical immigrant resided in
a neighborhood that was 32.7 percent first- or second-generation, and the respective statistic for
second-generation workers was 28.2 percent. In addition, there was a strong likelihood that
persons belonging to a particular ethnic group reside in a neighborhood where a relatively high
number of persons share the same ethnic group.37
The empiricalanalysisindicated that the rate of meanconvergence inthe skills of ethnic
groups was significantlyreducedafter controlling for neighborhood fixed effects, This finding
indicates that much of the ethnic capital effect works through the fact that low-income ethnic
groups cluster in low-income neighborhoods, and these neighborhood effects influence
intergenerational mobility. The analysis, however, also revealed that neighborhood effects cannot
account for the entire impact of ethnicity on intergenerational mobility, particularly for persons
residing in ethnically segregated neighborhoods. Ethnicity has an impact above and beyond both
parental and neighborhood effects for persons who are frequently exposed to a particular ethnic
environment.
There are many related issues and questions that are not addressed in this paper. For
instance, what happens to the nature and impact of ethnic externalities as the groups intermarry?
How do the different ethnic influences clash when disparate ethnic and racial groups cluster in the
same neighborhoods? What are the policy implications of the interactions between ethnic
externalities, residential segregation, and intergenerational mobility? Because of the underlying
significance of these questions, the study of the links between race, ethnicity, and human capital
externalities is sure to remain a fertile ground for thture research.38
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EconomicReview, June 1992, 2(3), pp. 409-429.TABLE 1. RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION IN 1970 CENSUS
Percent of Population in Neighborhood that is:
First or
Neighborhood Characteristics First Second Sample
of Average Person in: Generation GenerationBlack Hispanic Size
1st Generation 15.3 32.7 6.9 10.2 63,099
2nd Generation 6.7 28.2 4.3 5.2 156,134
3rd Generation 3.8 13.8 11.7 3.9 905,213
Hispanics:
1st Generation 22.2 36.7 6.5 35.0 10,713
2nd Generation 9.4 27.3 5.1 33.0 10,801
3rdGeneration 8,9 21.9 11.4 28.8 25,202
3rdGeneration;
Blacks 3.1 8.0 54.7 3.7 109,533
Whites 3.7 14.4 5.6 3.1 771,359
Notes: The "white" sample includes all non-black, non-Hispanic third generation workers. The
population proportions are as follows: immigrants, 4.8 percent; first or second generation, 16.6
percent; blacks, 11. 1 percent; and Hispanics, 4.4 percent.TABLE 2. RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION IN 1970 CENSUS, BY NATIONAL ORIGIN GROUP
First Generation SecondGeneration
Percent of Population Percent of Population
in NeighborhoodThat in Neighborhood That
is: is:
Percentof
Population in 1st or 2ndOfSame Sample 1stor2ndOf Same Sample
NationalOrigin GroupGeneration EthnicitySize GenerationEthnicitySize
Austria 0.6 34.5 2.0 883 30.1 2.1 6007
Azores 0.04 37.1 8.0 184 30.5 3.5 320
Belgium 0.07 28.9 0.4 250 21.8 0.7 573
British West Indies 0.03 24.8 0.8 175 24.0 0.8 188
Canada 1.8 25.7 6.2 6843 24.8 7.4 13085
Cuba 0.3 48.7 21.3 3119 27.6 4.7 270
China 0.2 38.5 9.2 1617 33.5 6.2 635
Czechoslovakia 0.5 34.6 2.3 797 25.6 2.9 4571
Denmark 0.2 24.9 0.5 289 20.2 0.9 1608
England 0.8 24.3 1.5 3113 23.5 1.5 6367
Finland 0.1 29.1 1.5 194 25.5 3.9 1200
France 0.2 28.7 0.4 811 23.8 0.3 1184
Gennany 1.7 27.2 2.9 5930 21.9 3.2 13089
Greece 0.3 38.3 2.6 1147 28.3 3.1 1913
Hungary 0.4 34.3 2.6 1020 28.0 1.9 3472
Ireland 0.8 36.2 4.6 1434 31.3 3.3 7137
Italy 2.8 37,7 15.3 5193 32.0 12.1 26476
Jamaica 0.06 28.4 2.2 507 22.3 1.5 163
Japan 0.2 26.1 3.2 1020 33.7 12.6 1716
Larvia 0.04 27.0 0.2 245 "3.1 0.1 260
Lebanon 0.05 27.0 0.3 118 23.7 0.4 476
Lithuania 0.2 36.2 3,7 325 30.6 3.5 2128
Mexico 1,3 35,4 22.6 5746 27.8 18.1 8412
Netherlands 0.2 23.9 1.8 689 21.5 3.9 1725
Northern Ireland 0.1 29.4 0.3 233 28.1 0.2 573
Norway 0.3 28.5 1.8 422 22.1 3.0 3203
Other West Indies 0.04 28,8 2.5 254 25.5 1.3 250
Philippines 0.2 31.0 5.9 1477 30.1 6.5 606
Poland 1.7 40.2 9.1 2846 32.0 7.8 15182
Portugal 0.1 40.9 11.2 654 32.7 6.8 1030
Romania 0.1 38.6 0.8 373 34.5 0.7 1150
Scotland 0.3 27.5 0.7 1013 24.4 0.7 2517
Sweden 0,4 29,1 3.4 445 22.3 1.7 4284
Switzerland 0.1 26.7 0.6 315 .20.3 0.8 947
Syria 0.04 30.9 1,7 103 27.9 0.8 387
Turkey 0.06 36.6 0.2 251 33.0 0.3 459
USSR 1.2 38.8 7.0 1738 34.9 7.8 12067
Wales 0.1 23.7 0.1 99 21.3 0.3 529
Yugoslavia 0.3 31.9 2.7 930 25.1 2.4 2309
Sample of 39 32.9 8.3 52802 28.3 6.6 148468
Note: The residential segregation measures give the percent of the population in the neighborhood that belongs to
the specified ethnic group for the average person in the sample.TABLE 3. RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION TN 1970 CENSUS,
BY DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS
Percent of Population in Neighborhood that is:
Neighborhood Characteristics1st or2nd Of Same
of Average Person in: GenerationBlack HispanicEthnicity Sample Size
1st Generation
Age:
18-34 31.7 7.9 11.9 8.7 21.532
35-64 33.2 6.3 9.3 8,2 41,567
Education:
Less than 12 years 35.5 7.3 13.3 11.7 30,590
12 years 30.8 6.6 7.8 5.8 17,000
13-15 years 29.5 6.1 7.4 4.6 7,959
16 or more years 29.1 6.4 5.7 3.4 7,550
Year Moved to House:
Before 1960 32.5 6.3 7.4 7.7 13,623
1960-1966 33.9 6.3 10 8.8 18,690
1967-1970 32.1 7.4 11.6 8.3 30,786
2nd Generation
Age:
18-34 27.4 4.9 7.6 6.6 31,824
35-64 28.5 4.1 4.6 6.5 124,310
Education:
Less than 12 years 28.7 4.8 6.7 8.4 61.896
12 years 28.1 3.9 4.4 6.0 56,725
13-15 years 27.4 3.9 4.6 4.7 19,311
lóor more years 27.8 3.8 3.3 4.2 18,212
Year Moved to House:
Before 1960 29.4 4.4 4.3 7.4 65,585
1960-1966 28.5 3.9 5.4 6.5 b,926
1967-1970 26.3 4.3 6.2 5.4 44,623
3rd Generation
Age:.
18-34 14.5 11.4 4.1 425,477
35-64 13.2 11.9 3.7 479,736
Education:
Less than 12 years 11.5 16.5 4.3 .346,392
12 years 14.5 9.4 3.6 334,888
13-15 years 15.9 8.1 3.9 129,884
16 or more years 17 6.7 3.3 94,049
Year Moved to House:
Before 1960 13.9 11.4 3.3 242,945
1960-1966 13.6 12.3 3.8 . 255,798
1967-1970 13.9 11.4 4.3 406,470TABLE 4. RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION IN NL SY, BY NATIONAL ORIGIN GROUP
Percent of Percent of Population in
Population inNeighborhood with Same
Ethnicity Group Ethnic Background Sample Size
American 7.6 18.2 743
American Indian 5.9 12.9 624
Asian Indian 0.2 2.0 22
Black 14.9 63.4 3055
Chinese 0.2 3.5 26
Cuban 0.4 33.3 117
English 18.9 23.9 1587
Filipino 0.4 5.0 44
French 3.5 5.6 316
German 17.4 25.7 1420
Greek 0.4 7.2 31
Hawaiian 0.1 0.2 20
Irish 11.0 14.3 956
Italian 6.2 16.3 498
Japanese 0.2 0.0 20
Korean 0.1 0.0 6
Mexican 4.1 50.3 1174
Other Hispanic 0.9 9.3 214
Polish 3.1 12.8 242
Portuguese 0.6 19.7 97
Puerto Rican 1.2 29.8 328
Russian 0.6 0.3 47
Scottish 1.5 4.6 122
Vietnamese 0.0 0.0 1
Welsh 0.5 1.0 3:
All 30.4 11745TABLE 5. SKILLS OF IMtVIIGPANT AND SECOND GENERATION WORKERS
Immigrants in 1940 Census 2ndGeneration in 1970 Census
Educational Sample Educational Sample
Country of Origin:Attainment Log WageSize Attainment Log WageSize
Austria 6.7 -0.349 1210 11.9 1.550 2134
Azores 5.0 -0.672 63 9.6 1.232 104
Belgium 7.8 -0.483 138 11.4 1.475 197
British West Indies 8.1 -0,810 58 12.2 1.368 68
Canada 9.2 -0.427 2741 12.0 1.431 4720
China , 6,3 -1.176 139 13.6 1.447 206
Cuba 8.6 -0.655 42 12.0 1.372 82
Czechoslovakia 6.8 -0.345 817 11.3 1.453 1749
Denmark 9.2 -0.392 327 12.0 1.405 553
England 9.5 -0.313 1656 12.5 1.508 2255
Finland 6.5 -0.539 244 11.3 1.457 390
France 9.0 -0.430 248 12.3 1.450 381
Germany 8.8 -0.467 2943 11.7 1.463 4558
Greece 6.9 -0.737 518 12.7 1.484 694
Hungary 7.1 -0.378 809 11.7 1.509 1298
Ireland 8.3 -0.445 1326 12.3 1.508 2645
Italy 5.4 -0.475 4784 11.2 1.454 10148
Japan 9.5 -0.849 141 12.5 1.476 662
Lithuania 4.5 -0,479 451 12.0 1.511 766
Mexico 4.4 -1.120 1192 9.2 1.133 2959
Netherlands 8.8 -0.557 292 11.7 1.487 623
Northern Ireland 8.3 -0.401 280 12.8 1.533 200
Norway 8.6 -0.441 606 12.0 1.457 987
Other West Indies 8.3 -0.821.119 11.9 1.353 87
Philippines 7.8 -1.009 233 11.9 1.268 188
Poland 5.4 -0.407 2610 11.3 1.492 5769
Portugal 4.7 -0.577 212 102 1.357 383
Romania 7.4 -0.339 300 13.2 1.647 428
Scotland 9.6 -0.326 862 12.4 1.511 901
Sweden 8.6 -0.378 1038 12.3 1.503 1534
Switzerland 9.5 -0.461 242 12.0 1.488 329
Syria 6.7 -0.547 105 12.5 1.576 131
Turkey 7.2 -0.523 211 13.7 1.644 144
USSR 7.0 -0.363 2418 13.1 1.654 4313
Wales 9.4 -0.426 10') 12.4 1.441 189
Yugoslavia 5.4 -0.340 512 11.7 1.499 928TABLE 6. ESTIMATES OF INThRGENERATIONAL CORRELA'ION IN 1970 CENSUS
Regressions Using
Regressions Using Neighborhood File County GroupFile
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
A. Education:
Mean of Group in 19400.3649 — 0.17070.2670 0.3628 --- 0.3316
(0.0828) (0.0457)(0.0557)(0.0833) (0.0709)
Includes Neighborhood No — Yes No — —-
FixedEffects
Includes CountyFixed No --- Yes
Effects
IncludesNeighborhood No — No Yes No — No
Characteristics
B. Log Wage
Meanof Group in19400.45490.39740.21910.2474 0.46070.37100.3938
(0.078 1)(0.0662) (0.0578) (0.0362)(0.0874) (0.0694) (0.0772)
Includes Skill-Adjusted No Yes No Yes No Yes No
Wage Level
Includes Neighborhood No No Yes No
Fixed Effects
IncludesCountyFixed No No Yes
Effects
Includes Neighborhood No No No Yes No No No
Characteristics
C.LogWage, Adjusted for Education
Mean ofGroup in 1940 0.20380.17670.11010.1020 0.21320.1589 0.1701
(0.0400) (0.0321) (0,0413)(0.0193)(0.0511) (0.0352)(0.0440)
Includes Skill-Adjusted No Yes No Yes No Yes No
Wage Level
IncludesNeighborhood No No Yes No
FixedEffects
IncludesCounty Fixed No No Yes
Effects
IncludesNeighborhood No No No Yes No No No
Characteristics
Notes:Standard errors are reported in parentheses; the sample size is 53,703. All regressions include asecond-
order polynomial in the worker's age. The neighborhoods characteristicsincludedin column 4 arc: the fraction of
persons intheneighborhood with at least 12 years of schooling, the fractionwithat least 16)/ears of schooling, the
laborforce participation rates of men and women, the unemployment rate, the fraction of persons working in
professionaloccupations, the fraction of familiesbelow thepo' c ty line, and the fractionoffamilies that earn at
least $15,000 annually. The rcgressions use a random-effects estimtor.TABLE 7. SKILLS OF ETHNIC GROUPS IN NLSY
EducationalAttainmentof: Log Wageof:
NLSY NLSY Census NLSY NLSYCensusSample
National Origin:RespondentsFathers Men RespondentsFathers Men Size
American 12.4 10.9 11.2 2.099 1.292 1.945 480
American indian 12.1 10.2 11.2 1.977 1.285 1.904 429
Asian Indian 14.0 11.9 16.7 1.684 1.464 2.180 7
Black 12.8 10.1 11.0 1.948 1.177 1.852 1795
Chinese 15.2 10.0 13.8 2.403 1.146 1.955 16
Cuban 13.4 11.0 11.3 2.403 1.293 1.876 69
English 13.0 11.9 12.9 2.085 1.353 2.093 1125
Filipino 13.9 13.0 13.8 2.471 1.388 2.009 21
French 12.8 11.7 11.7 2.074 1.329 2.123 203
German 13.4 12.2 12.9 2.167 1,317 2.115 1009
Greek 14.3 12.4 12.8 2.330 1.404 2,081 21
Hawaiian 12.7 9,5 12.1 2.470 1.282 2.006 6
Irish 13.4 12.6 12.8 2.219 1.401 2.098 651
Italian 13.4 12.3 12,6 2,345 1.375 2.141 347
Japanese 13.4 11.9 14,1 2.093 0.907 2.194 13
Korean 15,5 13.5 14.9 1.982 1.058 2.007 4
Mexican 12.3 7.4 9.0 2.015 1.114 1.808 723
Other Hispanic 13.1 10.5 11.4 2.217 1.254 1.893 102
Polish 13.4 11.8 13.0 2.242 1.389 2.164 Ill
Portuguese 12.0 8.8 10.5 2.159 1.267 1.984 59
Puerto Rican 11.9 7.9 9.6 2.249 1.156 1,798 170
Russian 15.0 13.6 15.3 2.666 1.486 2.324 39
Scottish 14.4 13.5 13.8 2.224 1.458 2.158 86
Welsh 14.8 14.5 13.8 1.987 1.542 2.150 23TABLE S. ESTIMATES OF ETHNIC CAPITAL MOEL IN NLSY
Regression
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
A. Education
ParentalSkills 0.2404 0.2005 0.1745 0.1784
(0.0666) (0.0669) (0.0718) (0.0849)
Ethnic Capital 0.2004 0.1356 0.0376 0.1480
(0.0465) (0.0301) (0.0288) (0.0504)
Includes CountyFixedEffects No Yes No No
IncludesNeighborhood Fixed Effects No No Yes No
Includes Neighborhood Characteristics No No No Yes
B. Log Wage Rate
Parental Skills 0.3774 0.2645 0.2500 0.2460
(0.0371) (0.0398) (0.0418) (0,0480)
Ethnic Capital 0.3 190 0.3 107 0.0458 0.0229
(0.1559) (0.1116) (0.1331) (0.1636)
IncludesCounty Fixed Effects No Yes No No
Includes Neighborhood Fixed Effects No No Yes No
Includes Neighborhood Characteristics No No No Yes
C. Log Wage, Adjusted for Education
Parental Skills 0.1765 0.1158 0.1214 0.1221
(0.0369) (0.0394) (0.0410) (0.0476)
EthnicCapital 0.0759 0.1581 -0.0231 0.0584
(0.1571) (0.1141) (0.1289) (0.1621)
IncludesCounty Fixed Effects No Yes No No
Includes Neighborhood Fixed Effects No No Yes No
Includes Neighborhood Characteristics No No No Yes
Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses.Thesample size is 7,569 for the educational attainment
regressionsand 4,261 for the log wage regressions. All regressions includc variables indicating the worke?s age.
gender, whether the person is first- or second-generation, and whether the person is enrolled in school in 1990.
The neighborhood characteristics included in column 4 are the average educational att.airnnent and the avenge log
wage of parents in the neighborhood. The regressions usc a random-effects estimator.TABLE 9. ESTIMATES OF INTERGENERATIONAL CORRELATION,
BY ETHNIC COMPOSITION OF NEIGHBOMIOOD
Education Log Wage
(I) (2) (1) (2)
Ethnic
Composition of Parental Ethnic ParentalEthnic ParentalEthnic ParentalEthnic




0Percent 0.2458 — 0.1467 -— 0.2567 --- 0.1322
(0.1195) (0.0781) (0.1020) (0.0447)
Between 0 and --- 0.3206 — 0.2261 -— 0.4702 --- 0.2920
15 Percent (0.1410) (0.0930) (0.1320) (0.0653)
Greater Than .-- 0.5325 — 0.2711 --- 0.6769 0.3782




Less Than 0.27480.1482 0.20710.0491 0.46360.1850 0.3 1780.0290
5 Percent (0.0126) (0.0791)(0.0131) (0.0257)(0.0719) (0.2085)(0.0758) (0.1422)
Between 5 and0.29330.2699 0.20140.0439 0.4 1980.2189 0,32920.0152
33 Percent (0.0116) (0.0863)(0.0125) (0.0267)(0.0654) (0.2092)(0.0737) (0.1440)
Greater Than 0.19650.2998 0.13110.1188 0.38280.2958 0.25860.1429
33 Percent (0.0105) (0.0848)(0.0105) (0.0268)(0.0575) (0.2094)(0.0618) (0.1253)
hcludes No Yes No Yes
Neighborhood
Fixed Effects
Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. The Census regressions include a second-order poiynomial in
the worker's age. The NLSY regressions control for the workefs age, gender, whether the person is iirst- or
second-generation, and whether the person is enrolled in school in 1990. The Census regressions have 53,703
observations; the NLSY education regressions have 7,569 observations, and the NLSY log wage regressions have
4,261 observations. The regressions use a random-effects estimator.TABLE 10. INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLE ESTIMATES OF
INTERGENERATIONALCORRELATION IN NLSY
Education Log Wage
(1) ________________ (1) (2)
ParentalEthnic ParentalEthnic ParentalEthnic Parental Ethnic
Model: SkillsCapital SkillsCapital SkillsCapital Skills Capital
All Workers 0.27810.1772 0.19840.0885 0.47760.3000 0.13660.4433
(0.0111) (0.0658)(0.0129) (0.0510)(0.0764) (0.2879)(0.0978) (0.2723)
Interactions with
Percent of Population
that Has Same Ethnicity
LessThan 0.33600.1230 0.29120.0090 0.53840.2516 0.14600.3955
5 Percent (0.0210) (0.0675)(0.0242) (0.0546)(0.1435) (0.3010)(0.1623) (0.2852)
Between Sand0.33780. 1076 0.23870.0765 0.42090.2794 0.14390.5579
33 Percent (0.0202) (0.0670)(0.0224) (0.0533)(0.1379) (0.2977)(0.1785) (0.2465)
GreaterThan 0.19630.2357 0.13500.1677 0.47440.3248 0.28480.3436
33 Percent (0.0168) (0.0660)(0.0176) (0.0532)(0.1154) (0.2929)(0.1354) (0,2805)
Includes No Yes No Yes
Neighborhood
FixedEffects
Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. The Census regressions include a second-order polynomial in
the worker's age. The NLSY regressions control for the workefs age, gender, whether the person is lint- or
second generation, and whether the person is enrolled in school in 1990. The instiuments used in the regression
include the avenge skills of the ther (either educational attainment or the log occupational wage) as reported by
the other siblings in the data; and the average of a set of dummy variables indicating the ethnic background
reported by the other siblings. The NLSY education regressions have 3,157 observations; the N'LSY log wage
regressions have 1,978 observations. The regressions use a random-effects estimator.To order any of thesepapers, see instructions attheend of thelist.To subscribeto all NUER Working
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